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CHRYSLER CORP. v. BROWN GREATER
PROTECTION FOR CORPORATE SECRECY
The United States Supreme Court recently handed down its long
awaited decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,' the first "reverse" Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA)2 case to be heard by the Court. A
reverse FOIA lawsuit is an action in which a private party-usually a
business entity-sues to enjoin a government agency from disclosing
information that the private party has submitted to the agency. The
FOIA is primarily intended to provide public access to government
records.3 Thus, the FOIA explicitly confers jurisdiction upon federal
district courts to review agency decisions to withhold information.4 A
reverse FOIA lawsuit plaintiff, however, has no explicit statutory basis
for relief under the FOIA because the Act does not grant to the courts
the jurisdiction to review agency decisions to disclose information.
1. 441 U.S. 281 (1979), rev'g Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.
1977).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
3. The FOIA was signed into law by President Johnson on July 4, 1966, as Public Law
89-487, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552, effective on July 4, 1967. It was enacted as a revision of
§ 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. Section 3 was the first general
statute providing for public disclosure of government records. But, as enacted, § 3 contained
disabling loopholes due to vague provisions, such as "matters of official record shall in ac-
cordance with published rule be made available to persons properly and directly concerned
except information held confidential for good cause found." 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (formerly
codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002) (emphasis added). Section 3 also excluded the disclosure of
information requiring secrecy in the public interest. In fact, agencies relied on § 3 to with-
hold information. It was "cited as statutory authority for the withholding of virtually any
piece of information that an official or any agency. . . [did] not wish to disclose." S. REP.
No. 89-813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
The FOIA, which replaced § 3, was enacted for the purpose of establishing "a general
philosophy of full agency disclosure." Id. at 3. The 1974 amendments to the FOIA were
"designed to facilitate freer and more expeditious public access to government information,
to encourage more faithful compliance with the terms and objectives of the FOIA." S. REP.
No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974). The 1976 amendments were intended to restrict
the broad provisions of pre-existing nondisclosure statutes that contravened the policy of the
FOIA. Exemption 3 of the FOIA was amended to include only matters required to be with-
held by a statute establishing "particular criteria for withholding" or "particular types of
matters to be withheld." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 6
infra. The 1978 amendments were minor, specifying the Special Counsel for the Civil Serv-
ice Commission as an organ to investigate an agency's wrongful withholding of information.
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (West Supp. 1979).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976) provides, in part, that "on complaint, the district court
of the United States . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the
complainant."
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Nevertheless, the courts have opened their doors to reverse FOIA law-
suits, the overwhelming majority of which involve corporations seeking
to protect the confidentiality of their business information submitted to
government agencies.
As grounds for reverse FOIA lawsuits, corporate plaintiffs have
relied primarily on three legal theories: an implied cause of action
under the FOIA on the ground that the FOIA mandates nondisclosure
of information falling within its nine exemptions,6 particularly, exemp-
tion four; secondly, an implied right to enjoin disclosure based upon
the Trade Secrets Act, section 1905 of the Criminal Code,7 which im-
5. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 (1979) and other reverse
FOIA cases cited in Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Needfor
CongressionalAction, 67 GEo. L.J. 103, 107-108 n.28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Campbell].
See also C. MARWICK, LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFOR-
MATION ACT 161-70 apps. (4th ed. 1978).
6. The nine exemptions from mandatory disclosure set forth in the FOIA are material:
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in
fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order,
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this
title [5 U.S.C. § 552b]), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or
(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial orfinancial information obtainedfrom aperson and
privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudica-
tion, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential
information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law en-
forcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports pre-
pared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological or geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9) (1976) (emphasis added).
7. The Trade Secrets Act in the Criminal Code provides:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department
or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or
to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of
his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation
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poses criminal sanctions on government employees who release certain
information and trade secrets; and finally, a right to a judicial review
based upon the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),8 which permits
courts to set aside an agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."9 Courts
have differed as to the validity of these three legal theories.' 0 Despite
the conflicting decisions of the federal circuits over the last five years,
the Supreme Court did not address the issues raised by reverse FOIA
litigation until Chrysler."
Chrysler was an excellent test case. In its reverse FOIA action,
made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or
agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the
trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity,
confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or ex-
penditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits
any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particu-
lars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; shall
be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
shall be removed from office or employment.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) (emphasis added).
8. Section 10(a) of the APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action ... is entitled to judicial
review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
9. Section 10(e) of the APA states, in pertinent part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.
The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law ....
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
10. See notes 58, 112, & 141-143 infra and accompanying text.
11. The reason the Supreme Court did not hear a reverse FOIA case before Chrysler is
because these lawsuits are a recent development. Although the Act was first passed in 1966,
the first FOIA case, Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212 (1973), rev'dand
remanded, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975), was not decided until 1973. Only after the 1974
amendments to the Act did reverse FOIA lawsuits begin to appear in significant numbers.
The purpose of the 1974 amendments was to encourage prompt and full disclosure. The
amendments provided that any person could request the information, shortened the time for
processing requests, and tightened sanctions for unduly withholding requested information.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2), 552(a)(4)(F)-(G), 552(a)(6)(A)-(B) (1976). The amendments conse-
quently caused a flood of FOIA requests. In response, an increasing number of reverse
FOIA actions were filed to enjoin disclosure of the requested information. According to the
Department of Justice, 76 reverse FOIA cases were filed in 1976, 63 in 1977, and 7 through
May 1978, with 104 cases pending. H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted
in [April 1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws [56], [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 95-
1382] (quoting the letter from Barbara Allen Babcock, Assistant Attorney General, Depart-
ment of Justice, to Richardson Preyer on May 19, 1978).
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Chrysler relied on all three legal theories. The Supreme Court rejected
the first theory, that the FOIA bars disclosure of information falling
within its exemptions. The Court held that, as the exemption provi-
sions of the FOIA do not mandate nondisclosure, the FOIA does not
provide, even implicitly, a cause of action to plaintiffs who seek to en-
join disclosure. 2 The Court also repudiated the second theory, that
section 1905 of the Criminal Code creates a private right of action to
reverse FOIA lawsuit plaintiffs. 13 The Supreme Court did, however,
uphold the third theory, that the APA affords a right to a judicial re-
view of an agency disclosure decision, and it added that under APA
review a court can block a disclosure that would violate section 1905.14
By limiting the ground for a reverse FOIA action exclusively to
reliance upon the APA, the Chrysler decision might appear to have
narrowed the path for future reverse FOIA litigants.' 5 The limitation
in the course to be taken by future reverse FOIA plaintiffs is, however,
more than amply offset by the Court's holding, which allows section
1905 to be reached through APA review. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Chrysler, section 1905 was of little use to corporate plaintiffs
seeking to enjoin disclosure of trade secrets and business information
submitted to government agencies. Before Chrysler, even after estab-
lishing that the submitted information fell within exemption four of the
FOIA dealing with trade secrets and commercial records, corporate
plaintiffs still had the task of overcoming the general agency policy of
disclosing even the exempt information. 6 Corporate plaintiffs had
been unable to utilize section 1905 in challenging the agency's decision
to disclose exemption-four information because, prior to Chrysler,
courts generally had held that agency regulations could authorize dis-
closure of information prohibited by section 1905.17 A recent House
Report had also viewed agency regulations as "law" that "authorizes"
disclosure of information within the scope of section 1905.18 But in
Chrysler, the Supreme Court held that the particular agency's regula-
12. 441 U.S. at 293-94. See text accompanying notes 62-69 infra.
13. 441 U.S. at 316. See text accompanying notes 86-96 infra.
14. 441 U.S. at 318. See text accompanying notes 127-130 infra.
15. One article reporting the Chrysler case is entitled Reverse Information Suits Curbed,
39 FACTS ON FILE 345 (1979).
16. A regulation of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) implementing
the 1974 amendments to the FOIA provides that even the FOIA-exempt information "shall
be made available. . . if it is determined that the requested inspection or copying furthers
the public interest and does not impede any of the functions of the OFCC or the Compliance
Agencies." 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.2(a) (1978).
17. See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
18. See note 111 infra and accompanying text.
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tions in question lacked the force of law and therefore could not be the
"authoriz[ation]" by law required by section 1905.19
The purpose of this note is to examine the Supreme Court's hold-
ings in Chrysler by analyzing how the Chrysler Court resolved the fed-
eral circuits' conflicting interpretations of the FOIA, section 1905, and
the scope of review. This note also discusses the Court's decision re-
garding the relationship between section 1905 and agency disclosure
regulations, and how its interpretation may affect the course of future
reverse FOIA litigation.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
Chrysler, as a government contractor with fifty or more employees
and a contract valued at $50,000 or more,20 was required by Executive
Order 11,24621 to take affirmative action to eliminate discrimination in
employment. Pursuant to the Order and agency regulations promul-
gated thereunder,2 2 Chrysler had to submit annual reports on its affirm-
ative action programs23 and equal employment opportunity forms24 to
its compliance agency,25 the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (for-
merly the Defense Supply Agency). Non-compliance would have re-
sulted in the cancellation, termination, or suspension of existing
contracts and debarment from future awards.
26
19. 441 U.S. at 295-316. See text accompanying notes 99-121 infra.
20. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a)(1) (1978).
21. Executive Order 11,246 was issued by President Johnson in 1965; it delegated the
responsibility for equal employment opportunity compliance by federal contractors to the
Secretary of Labor. 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1967). The administration of the Order was delegated
to the Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance who in turn delegated the
enforcement responsibility of the Order to sixteen federal agencies.
22. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.4(a)(5) & -l.7(a)(1) (1978).
23. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1978) provides:
An acceptable affirmative action program must include an analysis of areas within
which the contractor is deficient in the utilization of minority groups and women,
and further, goals and timetables to which the contractor's good faith efforts must
be directed to correct the deficiencies and, thus to achieve prompt and full utiliza-
tion of minorities and women, at all levels and in all segments of his work force
where deficiencies exist.
24. See id. § 60-1.7. Standard Form 100 (EEO-1) contained "statistical information
with respect to the total number of persons employed, and the number of minority and
female persons employed, by [Chrysler] in nine general job categories." Chrysler Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 173 (D. Del. 1976).
25. "'Compliance Agency' means the agency designated by the Director [of OFCC] on
a geographical, industry or other basis to conduct compliance reviews and to undertake such
other responsibilities in connection with the administration of [Executive Order 11,246] as
the Director may determine to be appropriate." 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.3 (1978).
26. See id. § 60-1.26.
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In May 1975, the DLA notified Chrysler by telephone27 that FOIA
requests had been made for Chrysler's affirmative action documents
that had been submitted to the agency. Despite the letters Chrysler had
sent to DLA objecting to the disclosure of such documents, the DLA
notified Chrysler by letter2 of its decision to release the documents the
following week based upon the DLA's determination that the material
was subject to disclosure under the FOIA and agency regulations.29
Chrysler immediately brought an action in the Delaware District
Court, seeking to enjoin the disclosure.
30
The district court conducted a trial de novo3I and found that cer-
tain documents, namely the manning tables,32 fell within the provisions
of the FOIA's fourth exemption.33 The court held that, being exempt
27. OFCC disclosure regulations, id. § 60-40.1 to -.8, do not require its compliance agen-
cies to provide formal notice to submitters in advance of scheduled disclosure of submitters'
business information. Chrysler had initially complained that its right to due process of law
had been violated by the FOIA and agency regulations because predisclosure notice was not
required. The district court and the appellate court had rejected Chrysler's due process
claim on the ground that Chrysler had been afforded a sufficient hearing by virtue of 41
C.F.R. § 60-60.4(d), which provides an opportunity to submitters to assert claims of confi-
dentiality at the time of submission of information. A recent House Report has recom-
mended that "it is consistent with basic notions of fairness that a submitter be given some
form of notice about the release of information." H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at
[33]. For example, the proposed Regulations on Confidential Business Information of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration contain the following provision: "No in-
formation is disclosed. . . unless the submitter of information is given written notice of the
Administrator's intention to disclose information. . . . Written notice is given at least ten
working days before the day of intended release." 43 Fed. Reg. 22,414 (1978).
28. See note 27 supra.
29. 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.1 to -40.8. An OFCC regulation provides that "all contract com-
pliance documents with the OFCC and the Compliance Agencies shall be disclosed upon
request unless specifically prohibited by law or as limited elsewhere herein." Id. 60-40.2(b).
30. Chrysler had ten days in which to appeal the agency disclosure decision to the Direc-
tor of OFCC. Chrysler, however, had to resort to an immediate court action because of the
agency's decision that the FOIA, as amended in 1974, prohibited the agency from withhold-
ing disclosure while Chrysler sought an administrative appeal. The Third Circuit held that
it could reach the merits of Chrysler's claim despite Chrysler's failure to exhaust its adminis-
trative remedy. The court stated: "Judicial review of agency action must be available at a
meaningful time. . . . Since disclosure would render moot any judicial review, the nature of
the subject matter demands that the action of. . . [DLA] be regarded as the final agency
action to which such review is directed." Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172,
1192-93 (3d Cir. 1977).
31. See note 139 infra and accompanying text.
32. The manning tables consisted of lists of Chrysler's job titles used internally and the
number of people performing each job.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1977), the text of which is set forth in note 6 supra. The Dela-
ware District Court relied on the "substantial competitive harm" test of National Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in determining that Chrysler's
manning tables were confidential information within the meaning of the FOIA's fourth ex-
emption. From the testimony of Chrysler's witnesses, the district court found that disclosure
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from the FOIA's mandatory disclosure provisions, the manning tables'
release was not controlled by the FOIA, but by agency regulations
promulgated under a housekeeping statute.34 One regulation 35 man-
dated the agency to abide by section 1905.36 The court found that
Chrysler's manning tables also fell within the ambit of section 1905.
The court permanently enjoined the DLA from disclosing the manning
tables because such disclosure, violating section 1905 and an agency
regulation as well, was clearly "not in accordance with law" and had to
be set aside under the APA.3 7
Chrysler appealed from the denial of injunctive relief for disclo-
sure of material other than the manning tables and from the denial of a
declaratory judgment regarding any future disclosure of similar mate-
rial. The government cross-appealed. 38 The Third Circuit agreed with
the district court that no reverse FOIA claim can be implied under the
FOIA and that judicial review must proceed only under the APA.3 9
The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the district court's position
on the scope of the APA review. It held that an APA review should not
be held de novo because "to conduct a trial de novo in reverse FOIA
cases would transfer primary decisional responsibility for agency dis-
of the manning tables could cause Chrysler "substantial competitive harm," because the
manning tables "could aid another corporation in its practice of employee raiding. . . to
determine the exact use of [Chrysler's] labor force, and thus the technology being applied by
[Chrysler], . . .[and] allow [Chrysler's] competitors to reduce their risk-taking." 412 F.
Supp. at 176.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) provides:
The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regu-
lations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the
distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preserva-
tion of its records, papers, and property. This section does not authorize withhold-
ing information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public.
35. 29 C.F.R. § 70.21(a) (1978) provides:
Pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 1905, every officer and employee of the
Department of Labor is prohibited from publishing, divulging, disclosing, or mak-
ing known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information
coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of
any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or
filed with the Department or any agency or officer or employee thereof, which
information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of
work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or
source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partner-
ship, corporation, or association. No officer or employee of the Department of
Labor shall disclose records in violation of this provision of law.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 7 supra.
37. 412 F. Supp. at 177-78. See note 9 supra for the text of§ 10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1976).
38. 565 F.2d at 1175.
39. Id. at 1185, 1190-92.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
closure from the administrative agencies to the federal courts."4
The Third Circuit also held that the agency's proposed disclosure
was not contrary to law because it did not violate section 1905.41 The
court ruled that the nondisclosure provision of section 1905 applied
only to disclosures "not authorized by law" and that a disclosure pursu-
ant to agency regulations promulgated under the housekeeping stat-
ute42 is authorized by law.43 The Third Circuit remanded the case on
the ground that the agency record under review was inadequate in that
it failed to indicate whether the proposed disclosure was based on "a
determination that disclosure is mandated by the FOIA or is in the
public interest and thus permissible"'  under the agency's disclosure
regulations.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit
and rejected the two legal theories of relief based on the FOIA itself
and section 1905, while accepting the third theory of relief under the
APA.45 The Court, however, held that the disclosure regulations of the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance46 lacked the "force and effect of
law" to authorize disclosure prohibited by section 1905.47 It, therefore,
remanded the case to the appellate court for a determination of
whether the proposed disclosure would violate section 1905 and thus
become enjoinable under the APA, which requires a reviewing court to
set aside agency action "not in accordance with law."
'4
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A. No Basis for Reverse Claim in the FOA
Chrysler contended that the FOIA's nine exemptions require an
agency to withhold exempt information because "the nine exemptions
in general, and Exemption 4 in particular reflect a sensitivity to the
privacy interest of private individuals and nongovernmental entities. ' 49
In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court rejected Chrysler's contention as being unsupported by the "lan-
40. 565 F.2d at 1191.
41. Id. at 1188.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 34 supra.
43. 565 F.2d at 1187.
44. Id. at 1192.
45. 441 U.S. at 293-94, 316, 318.
46. See, e.g., regulations cited in note 29 supra.
47. 441 U.S. at 295-316. See text accompanying notes 99-123 infra.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 9 supra.
49. 441 U.S. at 291.
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guage, logic or history of the [FOIA]." ° The Court noted:5 that it had
already intimated its stance on this theory in its first decision concern-
ing the FOIA, EPA v. Mink. 2 In Mink, the Supreme Court had stated:
"Subsection (b) of the Act creates nine exemptions from compelled dis-
closures. These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(c), and are plainly intended to set up concrete, workable stan-
dards for determining whether particular material may be withheld or
must be disclosed."5 3
In Chrysler, the Supreme Court reiterated this view when it stated
that the language of subsection (b)5 4 simply "demarcates the limits of
the agency's obligation to disclose; it does not foreclose disclosure."
55
The Court indicated that the lack of explicit provision in the FOIA for
judicial relief to enjoin disclosure demonstrates that the Act is "exclu-
sively a disclosure statute."5 6 The Court also examined the legislative
history of the FOIA and concluded that "Congress did not design the
FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure.
5 7
In the past, the great majority of the courts determined that the
FOIA exemptions were merely permissive.5 8 Commentators generally
supported the view that the exemptions do not restrict an agency's dis-
closure decision. 9 The House Committee on Government Operations
50. Id.
51. Id. at 290 n.9.
52. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
53. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), the text of which is set forth in note 6 supra.
55. 441 U.S. at 292.
56. Id.
57. Id at 293.
58. The Third Circuit in Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), the Fifth
Circuit in Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Gir. 1976), the Eighth
Circuit in General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and
remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979), and the District of Columbia Circuit in Charles River Park
"A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975), held that the FOIA exemptions are per-
missive. Only the Fourth Circuit, in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 431 U.S. 924
(1977), held that the FOIA exemptions, particularly the fourth exemption, absolutely bar
disclosure of information within their terms. The Ninth Circuit in Union Oil Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 542 F.2d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), adopted the same view but had subse-
quently withdrawn that holding as premature.
59. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5:8 (2d ed. 1978); Campbell,
supra note 5, at 132-33; Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of
Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEX.
L. REV. 587, 597-602 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Clement]; Drachsler, The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act and the 'Right" of Non-Disclosure, 28 AD. L. REv. 1, 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Drachsler]; Note, 'Reversing" the Freedom of Information Act: Congressional Intention or
1979]
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also expressed a similar opinion in a recent report.60 The Chrysler
Court's holding that the FOIA exemptions are discretionary exceptions
to the general disclosure obligations is in line with the FOIA's basic
philosophy of the fullest possible disclosure: "The purpose. . . [of the
FOIA] is to make it clear beyond doubt that all materials of the Gov-
ernment are to be made available to the public."'"
Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate on how it reached its
next conclusion, I that a reverse' FOIA claim, cannot I be, basedl on I the
FOIA. The Court merely stated: "Congress did not limit an agency's
discretion to disclose information when it enacted the FOIA. It neces-
sarily follows that the Act does not afford Chrysler any right to enjoin
agency disclosure."6 The Third Circuit had viewed the issues of
whether the exemptions made nondisclosure mandatory and whether
they created an implied right of action as separate but "interdepen-
dent."' 63 The Supreme Court seemed to agree with the reasoning of the
Third Circuit that "it would obviously be difficult to imply a cause of
action under the FOIA to bar government officials from releasing in-
formation the disclosure of which Congress intended to leave to agency
discretion."64
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger,65 the Fourth Circuit,
while interpreting the exemptions to be discretionary,66 held that the
FOIA "carries with it an implied right in the private party to invoke the
equity powers of a court."' 67 The Supreme Court had denied the gov-
Judicial Invention?, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 734, 736 (1977) [hereinafter cited as "Reversing"
the Act].
60. "Nothing in the language of FOIA directly supports the argument that the exemp-
tions are mandatory, and the legislative history of the original law and the 1974 amendments
clearly reflects the intention of the Congress that the exemptions are permissive." H.R. REP.
No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [58]-[59].
61. S. REP. No. 89-813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1965) (emphasis in original).
62. 441 U.S. at 294.
63. 565 F.2d at 1185.
64. Id.
65. 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 431 U.S. 924 (1977). The facts in that case were identical to those in Chrysler; the
plaintiffs were government contractors seeking injunctive relief against the disclosure of in-
formation they had submitted to the agency.
66. Id. at 1197.
67. Id. at 1211. The Fourth Circuit reached this conclusion from an analysis of the
legislative history of the FOIA's fourth exemption:
The protection from disclosure given such information by Exemption 4 was stated
in the legislative hearings to have been granted to such information "not only as a
matter offairness, but as a matter ofight, and as a matter basic to our free enter-
prise system." (Italics added [by Fourth Circuit]) In enacting such exemption the
Congress had balanced the right to public disclosure against the right of the private
party to protection and had opted for the right to privacy in favor of the private
Vol. 13
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ernment's petition for certiorari in Westinghouse.68  In Chrysler, the
Supreme Court did not rule directly on whether there exists an implied
right under the FOIA. Nevertheless, given the Court's holding that the
FOIA does not afford "any right to enjoin agency disclosure,"6 9 the
implied right theory no longer seems viable.
The Third Circuit supported its decision to reject the implied right
theory with the argument that recognizing an implied right to enjoin
agency disclosure of exempt information would "place in the hands of
interested submitters of information, rather than those of presumably
disinterested governmental officials, the authority to take steps which
might impede the dissemination of information of public impor-
tance."'70 This argument may not always be applicable because govern-
mental officials often lack sufficient knowledge to assert properly the
submitters' right to confidentiality. In Chrysler the Supreme Court
stated that "the congressional concern was with the agency's need or
preference for confidentiality. ' 72  Congress, however, intended the
fourth exemption to be "for the benefit of persons who supply informa-
tion as well as the agencies which gather it."'73 A recent House Report
interest. This provision in the Act was more than a simple exemption; it repre-
sented an express affirmation of a legislative policy favoring confidentiality of pri-
vate information furnished government agencies, the disclosure of which might be
harmful to private interests. It was manifestly intended to protect that private in-
terest. And when a statute, whether phrased in the form of an exemption or not,
grants a private I5arty protection [from disclosure], it carries with it an implied right
in the private party to invoke the equity powers of a court to assure him that pro-
tection.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). For an article reviewing the Fourth Circuit's
holding concerning the implied right theory, see "Reversing" the Act, supra note 59, at 744-
52.
68. 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
69. 441 U.S. at 294. (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 62 supra.
70. 565 F.2d at 1185.
71. Several commentators have expressed views contrary to the opinion of the Third
Circuit that governmental officials are more suitable than private parties to invoke the right
to protection from disclosure. In Patten & Weinstein, Disclosure of Business Secrets Under
the Freedom of Information Act: Suggested Limitations, 29 AD. L. REV. 193, 203 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Patten & Weinstein], the authors noted:
Sanctions may be imposed against the government or its employees if a record is
unreasonably withheld. This institutional bias may be an appropriate means for
loosening the government's hold on its own internal records but is of questionable
propriety where the government must decide whether to release private business
records. Disclosure is the path of least resistance to the agency. Biasing the deci-
sionmaker in favor of disclosure, where there is neither the incentive, knowledge
nor time needed to determine whether secrecy is truly justified, practically insures
that business data will not receive any degree of protection at the administrative
level.
72. 441 U.S. at 292-93. (emphasis in original).
73. H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [27].
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cited approvingly a two-fold test for confidentiality set forth by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals in National Parks and Conservation
Ass'n v. Morton:74
Commercial or financial information is confidential under ex-
emption 4 if disclosure is likely to have either of the following
effects:
(1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain neces-
sary information in the future; or
(2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position
of the person from whom the information was obtained.75
The House Report also noted that the first test, compared to the second
test, became less significant when information was submitted as a
mandatory condition for obtaining a government contract.7 6 As a gov-
ernment contractor, Chrysler had no choice but to submit its business
information; therefore, the Supreme Court in Chrysler should have
stressed the congressional concern for the submitter's need for confiden-
tiality.
In Chrysler, the Supreme Court also stated that "the FOIA by it-
self protects the submitters' interest in confidentiality only to the extent
that this interest is endorsed by the agency collecting the informa-
tion." 77 This statement would allow an agency to issue regulations
mandating nondisclosure of information exempt under the FOIA. The
Chrysler Court cited to such a statute promulgated by the Federal Avi-
ation Administration, which prohibits disclosure of information cov-
ered by the FOIA's fourth exemption.78  The Food and Drug
74. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
75. H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [22] (citing National Parks & Conservation
Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
76. The need for agencies to guarantee confidentiality is particularly significant in
the field of statistical or research activities, where the Government must generally
rely on the cooperation of the private sector to obtain comprehensive and reliable
data. Where mandatory collection authority exists or where business entities sub-
mit information in order to qualify for some Government benefit, such as a license,
grant, or contract, it is obviously not as significant a factor.
H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [22] n.52 (quoting COMMISSION ON FEDERAL
PAPERWORK, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY 100 (1977)). If information is required to be
submitted to the government, there is little danger that disclosure will impair the ability of
the government to obtain such information in the future.
77. 441 U.S. at 293.
78. 49 U.S.C. § 1357(d)(2) (1976) provides:
Notwithstanding [the FOIA], the Administrator shall prescribe such regulations as
he may deem necessary to prohibit disclosure of any information obtained. . . if,
in the opinion of the Administrator, the disclosure of such information-
(B) would reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential commercial or
financial information obtained from any person. . ..
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Administration (FDA) has promulgated a similar regulation, which
provides that the agency may not make any discretionary release of
exemption-four material.7 9
A recent House Report, however, opposed the issuance of such
nondisclosure regulations as being inconsistent with the FOIA's basic
policy of full agency disclosure.80 It recommended that "[a]gencies
such as FDA that have issued nondisclosure rules should review the
utility and legality of the rules." 8' Even if the agencies' nondisclosure
regulations are valid, the only relief still available does not come from
the FOIA itself but from the APA, because an agency's decision con-
trary to its regulations could be enjoined only by invoking the "not in
accordance with law" provision of the APA. 2 Nevertheless, if the
agencies could mandate nondisclosure of FOIA-exempt information by
their regulations, as intimated by the Chrysler Court,83 then, even with-
out invoking section 1905, reverse FOIA litigation could proceed under
the more definite standard of "not in accordance with law" rather than
the vague and uncertain standards of "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion" set forth in the APA. 4
B. The Applicabiliy of Section 1905
1. Section 1905 Creates No Private Right To Enjoin Disclosure
Relying on its prior decisions8" and finding no evidence of legisla-
tive intent to create a civil cause of action under the criminal disclosure
statute of section 1905,86 the Chrysler Court held that section 1905 does
not afford a private right of action to enjoin disclosure in violation of
the statute. 87 A recent House Report reiterated that "[o]ne of the neces-
79. 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c) (1979) provides: "Data and information submitted or divulged
to the Food and Drug Administration which fall within the definitions of a trade secret or
confidential commercial or financial information are not available for public disclosure."
80. "No rules should be issued providing that business documents are absolutely not
releasable." H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [48]. Although the Chrysler case was
decided about nine months after this report by the Committee on Government Operations
was presented to the House, the Supreme Court did not make any reference to the report.
This is puzzling because the report is entitled Freedom of Informaion Act Requestsfor Busi-
ness Data and Reverse-FOI4 Lawsuits.
81. Id.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 9 supra.
83. 441 U.S. at 293.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 9 supra.
85. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S.
191 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241
U.S. 33 (1916).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 7 supra.
87. 441 U.S. at 316-17.
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sary prerequisites [for implying a private cause of action under a feder-
al criminal statute] is the unavailability of alternative avenues of
redress."88 Similarly, finding an adequate remedy under the APA, the
Court saw no reason to imply a private right to relief under section
1905.89
The Chrysler Court did not address the issue of whether section
1905, taken in conjunction with exemption three of the FOIA,90 implies
a private right of action to enjoin disclosure. The preliminary question
of whether section 1905 is an exempting statute within the terms of
exemption three after the 1976 amendment9' remains unresolved.92
The Committee on Government Operations recently stated that it "has
never considered that section 1905 qualified under exemption 3, and
since the [1976 amendment] only narrowed the scope of the exemption,
it is not possible for section 1905 to qualify under the amended exemp-
tion."93 Qualifying section 1905 as an exemption-three statute, how-
ever, would not afford an implied right to enjoin disclosure because, as
the Committee on Government Operations observed in a previous re-
port, "[t]he Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, which relates only to
the disclosure of information 'not authorized by law,' would not permit
the withholding of information otherwise required to be disclosed by
the [FOIA], since the disclosure is there authorized by law." 94
In conjunction with exemption four of the FOIA, section 1905
might imply a private right to equitable relief because the FOIA does
not explicitly authorize disclosure of exempt information. Although
the Chrysler Court did not "attempt to determine the relative ambits of
Exemption 4 and § 1905," 9 the Court did intimate that exemption four
and section 1905 are coextensive. 96 The Court's interpretation indi-
88. H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [60].
89. The Court stated that "most importantly, a private right of action under § 1905 is
not 'necessary to make effective the congressional purpose,' . . . for we find that [the
agency's review of the decision] to disclose Chrysler's employment data is available under
the APA." 441 U.S. at 317 (footnote omitted).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 6 supra.
91. See note 3 supra.
92. The Supreme Court stated: "We, of course, do not here attempt to determine. ..
whether § 1905 is an exempting statute within the terms of the amended Exemption 3." 441
U.S. at 319 n.49.
93. H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [60] n.211.
94. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2183, 2205.
95. 441 U.S. at 319 n.49.
96. The Chrysler Court noted "the similarity of language between Exemption 4 and the
substantive provisions of § 1905." Id. Courts that have considered the scope of exemption
four and § 1905 have all found them to be coextensive. See, e.g., Charles River Park "A",
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rectly provides that nondisclosure of exemption-four information is
mandatory, because no agency would determine to disclose exemption-
four information, knowing that such disclosure would also mean a vio-
lation of the criminal statute of section 1905.
2. Section 1905's Applicability Not Limited by Agency Regulations
In Chrysler, the Government contended that, even if section 1905
provided equitable relief to a private party like Chrysler, section 1905
was not applicable to the disclosure Chrysler sought to enjoin. The
Government's argument was that the DLA's proposed disclosure did
not fall within the prohibition of section 1905 because the disclosure,
pursuant to the agency's regulations, 97 was "authorized by law" within
the meaning of the statute.98 The Supreme Court responded that "in
order for such [agency's] regulations to have the 'force and effect of
law,' it is necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations and
some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress." 99
Addressing the issue of whether there had been some delegation of
legislative authority, the Supreme Court first looked to and rejected the
FOIA itself. The Court stated that "the Government cannot rely on the
FOIA as congressional authorization for disclosure regulations that
permit the release of information within the Act's nine exemptions." 100
Taken alone, this statement seems inconsistent with the Court's inter-
pretation that agencies have discretion to release the FOIA-exempt in-
formation. As explained by Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion,
the Court did not mean by this statement that regulations permitting
disclosure of the FOIA-exempt information are "in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right."'' 1
The Court's holding that the FOIA does not mandate nondisclosure of
exempt information allows agencies to issue regulations providing for
disclosure of exempt information. The FOIA, however, cannot be the
source of congressional authorization for regulations providing for dis-
closure of exempt information that falls within section 1905 as well.
Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-42 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Clement, supra note 59,
at 605 & n.79.
97. See regulations cited in notes 16 & 29 supra.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 7 supra.
99. 441 U.S. at 304.
100. Id. at 303-04. The Court's conclusion is based on the rationale that disclosure of
exempt information is not controlled by the FOIA. Id. It suggests that there is authority in
the FOIA for agencies to issue regulations that provide for disclosure of nonexempt infor-
mation collected by the agencies.
101. Id. at 320 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Section 1905 contains a specific exception of disclosure "authorized by
law," 102 but the regulations, lacking congressional authorization, can-
not supply that "law." The Chrysler Court did note that the FOIA
itself could supply that "law," if the information to be disclosed is
outside the FOIA exemptions yet within section 1905.1°3
In Chrysler, the Court also repudiated the Government's conten-
tion that the agency's disclosure regulations had the force of law by
virtue of Executive Order 11,246.' ° The Government relied on section
201 of the Executive Order, which confers authority upon the Secretary
of Labor to "adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as
he deems necessary and appropriate to achieve the purposes [of the
Order]. l"' The Supreme Court found that the purpose of the Order
was to put "an end to discrimination in employment."'' 0 6 The Court
concluded that an Order, which does not manifest any concern for the
disclosure of information to the public, cannot be the source of delega-
tion of disclosure authority to an agency.0 7 Once again, the conclusion
of the Court is misleading because it suggests that the Secretary of La-
bor lacks the authority to promulgate regulations for disclosure of in-
formation concerning companies' affirmative action programs. Such
disclosure regulations issued pursuant to Executive Order 11,246 are
valid, but they lack the force and effect of law to authorize disclosure
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 7 supra.
103. The Court stated in a footnote that "there is a theoretical possibility that material
might be outside Exemption 4 yet within the substantive provisions of § 1905, and that
therefore the FOIA might provide the necessary 'authoriz[ation] by law' for purposes of
§ 1905." 441 U.S. at 319 n.49.
104. See note 21 supra.
105. 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
106. 441 U.S. at 307.
107. Id. In Chrysler, the Government argued that the disclosure policy of the OFCC's
regulations was to further the purpose of the Executive Order, ie., to combat discrimination
in employment. One disclosure regulation provides that "[i]t is the policy of the OFCC to
disclose information to the public and to cooperate with other public agencies as well as
private parties seeking to eliminate discrimination in employment." 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.1
(1978). Another OFCC subsection, however, provides that its compliance agencies will
make all information available to "any person" regardless of motives. Id. § 60-40.2. FOIA-
exempt information will also be released if it "furthers the public interest," but there is no
qualification in the regulation that the interest must be to end discrimination in employ-
ment. Id. The Court had to conclude:
Were a grant of legislative authority as a basis for Executive Order 11246 more
clearly identifiable, we might agree with the Government that this "compatibility"
gives the disclosure regulations the necessary legislative force. But the thread be-
tween these regulations and any grant of authority by the Congress is so strained
that it would do violence to established principles of separations of powers to de-
nominate these particular regulations "legislative" and credit them with the "bind-
ing effect of law."
441 U.S. at 307-08.
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that is prohibited by section 1905 and not mandated by the FOIA. In
his concurring opinion in Chrysler, Justice Marshall explained. the ra-
tionale behind this conclusion of the Court: "In imposing the authori-
zation requirement of § 1905, Congress obviously meant to allow only
those disclosures contemplated by congressional action. . . . Otherwise
the agencies Congress intended to control could create their own excep-
tions to § 1905 simply by promulgating valid disclosure regulations."' 08
In Chrysler, the Supreme Court also rejected the Government's ar-
gument that the housekeeping statute, section 301 of Title 5,1°9 is a
grant of legislative authority to government agencies' disclosure regula-
tions.' 1° Prior to Chrysler, Congress"1' and the courts 1 12 in general had
interpreted section 301 as providing agencies with the authority to pro-
mulgate regulations for the disclosure of FOIA-exempt information. In
Chrysler, the Supreme Court held that the "regulations pursuant to
§ 301 could not provide the 'authoriz[ation] by law' required by
§ 1905."' 1 13 Relying upon the legislative history and the terms of sec-
tion 301, the Court found that the statute was "simply a grant of au-
thority to the agency to regulate its own affairs.""' 4
The Court also relied upon the legislative history of the 1958
amendment to section 301 in reaching this conclusion." 5 The Court
looked to the statement, made by Congressman Moss during the de-
bates on the 1958 amendment, that the amendment would "'not affect
the confidential status of information given to the Government and
108. 441 U.S. at 320. (Marshall, J., concurring).
109. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 34 supra.
110. 411 U.S. at 309-10.
111. The Committee on Government Operations had recently stated: "If agencies may
release exempt information . . . then section 1905 is not applicable. . . . Regulations au-
thorizing disclosure may be issued. . . under 5 U.S.C. 301, the 'housekeeping' statute."
H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [61].
112. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979) (holding "disclosure pursuant to the OFCC reg-
ulations is 'authorized by law' and not within the prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 1905"); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding "regulations valid
under 5 U.S.C. § 301 satisfy the 'authorized by law' exception of Section 1905"), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 (1979). But see Charles
River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding § 301 "does
not authorize regulations limiting the scope of section 1905").
113. 441 U.S. at 311.
114. Id. at 309.
115. The 1958 amendment to § 301, supra note 34, added the following portion to the
original provision: "This section does not authorize withholding information from the pub-
lic or limiting the availability of records to the public." Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-619, 72 Stat. 547.
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carefully detailed in title 18, United States Code, section 1905.' "116 It
rejected the Government's and the Third Circuit's interpretation that
Congressman Moss' statement had been made only with reference to
the amendment." 7 In Chrysler, the Court was not concerned with
whether "the amendment eliminated disclosure authority," as the
Third Circuit had been."18 The Supreme Court did not doubt that sec-
tion 301 is a source of an agency's authority for the promulgation of
certain disclosure regulations; it merely held that "[s]ection 301 does
not authorize regulations limiting the scope of section 1905."''1 9
Chrysler's compliance agency's disclosure regulations themselves ex-
plicitly exempted "records disclosure of which isprohibitedby law.""2
To hold that these regulations could limit the applicability of the fed-
eral law of section 1905 seems illogical. In contrast, the Court's conclu-
sion is very sound. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the nexus
between the agency's regulations promulgated pursuant to section 301
and the nondisclosure statute of section 1905 should be welcomed. To
allow any agency's regulations to overrule the specific language of sec-
tion 1905 would give government officials "the unbridled freedom to
redefine the scope of [their own] illegal conduct under section 1905." 21
Finally, the Supreme Court pointed out a procedural defect in the
disclosure regulations of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. 22
The Court found that these regulations were not properly promulgated
as legislative or substantive rules and were merely interpretative
rules.' 23 As interpretative rules, these disclosure regulations lack the
116. 441 U.S. at 311 (quoting 104 CoNG. REc. 6550 (1958)).
117. A commentator has expressed the same view as that of the Government in Chrysler:
Mr. Moss never stated that the housekeeping statute itself was not intended to af-
fect information encompassed by section 1905-only that the amendment to the
housekeeping statute would not affect the prohibitions against disclosure contained
in section 1905 . . . . It is a vast distortion to interpret this statement. . . to mean
that the 1958 amendment limited the broad disclosure power originally conferred
upon agencies by the housekeeping statute in 1789.
Clement, supra note 59, at 622. In Chrysler, the Supreme Court interpreted the purpose of
the 1958 amendment as limiting agencies' tendency to invoke § 301 as a source of authority
to withhold information from the public, and not as granting authority for limiting the scope
of§ 1905. 441 U.S. at 310.
118. 565 F.2d at 1187.
119. 441 U.S. at 312 (citing Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)).
120. 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.2 (1978) (emphasis added).
121. This was the argument presented by the plaintiff in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd,
575 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1978), a reverse FOIA case similar to Chrysler. See note 112
supra. The case was recently remanded, sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, by the
Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Chrysler. 441 U.S. 918 (1979).
122. 441 U.S. at 312.
123. Id. at 315. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the following statement
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effect of law and thus cannot authorize disclosure that is prohibited by
section 1905.124 But as Justice Marshall noted in his concurring opin-
ion, "the agency could rectify this shortcoming" 125 by promulgating its
disclosure regulations in strict compliance with section 4 of the APA. 1
26
C The APA as the Only Basis for a Reverse FOZA Claim
In Chrysler, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed on the availa-
bility of APA review of the agency's disclosure decision. 127 The Court
agreed, too. It held that under the APA Chrysler was entitled to judi-
cial review of the agency's decision to disclose its business informa-
tion.' 28 Chrysler alleged that the agency's proposed disclosure would
harm Chrysler's competitive position in business. Thus, Chrysler was
"a person" who would be "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action" within the terms of section 10(a) of the APA.1
29
APA review is not available to the extent that "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."' 3 ° The Court stated that this
exception does not apply unless ""statutes are drawn in such broad
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."' ,, 31 In Chrysler,
the Court found that section 1905 and the regulation 132 imposed on the
agency to comply with section 1905 place substantive limits on the
agency's disclosure decision to make the decision a reviewable ac-
tion. '1 Section 1905, which imposes criminal sanctions on government
employees who disclose information within its ambit, apparently pre-
cludes discretion with respect to such disclosure. The Court indicated
that, if the disclosure challenged by Chrysler was found to be within
of the Secretary of Labor at the time of the publication of the disclosure regulations: "As the
changes made by this document relate solely to interpretive rules, general statements of pol-
icy, and to rules of agency procedure and practice, neither notice of proposed rule making
nor public participation therein is required by 5 U.S.C. 553." 441 U.S. at 314-15 (quoting 38
Fed. Reg. 3192, 3193 (1973)) (emphasis added).
124. 441 U.S. at 315-16.
125. Id. at 320 n.l (Marshall, J., concurring).
126. Section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553, provides that before a substantive rule is
promulgated, agencies must afford interested persons general notice of proposed rulemak-
ing. The OFCC regulations were promulgated without the issuance of such notice.
127. The circuits that have considered this issue have all decided that reverse FOIA
claims can be based on the APA. See cases cited in note 58 supra.
128. 441 U.S. at 317-18.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), the text of which is set forth in note 8 supra.
130. Id. § 701(a)(2).
131. 441 U.S. at 317 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945))).
132. 29 C.F.R. § 70.21, the text of which is set forth in note 35 supra.
133. 441 U.S. at 317-18 & n.48.
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section 1905, the disclosure should be enjoined.' 34 Any decision that
violates both section 1905 and an agency regulation is "not in accord-
ance with law" within the meaning of section 10(e) of the APA and
must be set aside.1
3 5
The Chrysler Court noted that "[j]urisdiction to review agency ac-
tion under the APA is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "1136 The Court re-
ferred to Califano v. Sanders,I1 7 a case in which the Court made it clear
that the APA does not independently confer subject-matter jurisdiction
on federal courts.1
3 8
In Chrysler, the Government and Chrysler disagreed on the proper
scope of APA review. Chrysler contended that there should be a de
novo review, while the Government argued that the review should be
limited to the administrative record of the agency unless it was an "ex-
traordinary" case. 139 In the past, the courts had differed on the scope of
APA review. The FOIA is silent on the scope of judicial review in
reverse FOIA cases, while explicitly mandating de novo review for nor-
mal FOIA cases.'4 ° While some courts have held that judicial review
of reverse FOIA cases should be limited to the agency's administrative
record to determine whether an abuse of discretion had occurred,'
4'
several courts have maintained that de novo review is appropriate for
134. Id. at 1726.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), the text of which is set forth in note 9 supra.
136. 441 U.S. at 317 n.47. Section 1331 of title 28, U.S.C., provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,
except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought
against.. . any agency ....
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
137. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
138. Until Califano v. Sanders, id., the circuits had disagreed as to whether the APA
establishes jurisdiction. Compare, e.g., Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935,
939 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding jurisdiction proper under APA) with Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1206 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 431 U.S. 924 (1977) (holding jurisdiction not proper under APA).
For an article dealing extensively with the jurisdictional issue of reverse FOIA litigation, see
Campbell, supra note 5, at 160-88.
139. 441 U.S. at 318. Reverse FOIA lawsuit plaintiffs would prefer de novo review be-
cause it allows the court to take evidence anew and can be a more severe review of the
agency's exercise of discretion.
140. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
141. General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated
and remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1192 (3d
Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
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reverse FOIA cases as well.' 42 Other courts had concluded that
whether the information is exempt should be determined de novo, but
whether it may nonetheless be disclosed should be determined only on
the basis of the agency's own record.'
43
In Chrysler, the Supreme Court did not settle the issue conclu-
sively and limited its holding to a very narrow one: "De novo review
by the District Court is ordinarily not necessary to decide whether a
contemplated disclosure runs afoul of § 19 05 ."144 Because whether the
challenged disclosure violates section 1905 or some other nondisclosure
statutes must necessarily be the first determination to be made in an
APA review, the Court's statement proposes that judicial review need
not be de novo in reverse FOIA cases. The House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations shares this view. According to the Committee, the
"existing law requires a court in a reverse-FOIA case to review the
agency record and determine only whether the agency has acted arbi-
trarily or capriciously under the standard of the [APA]."' 145 Because
the Supreme Court did not resolve this issue "with sufficient clarity,"1
46
an amendment to the FOIA specifying the scope of review for reverse
FOIA cases can be expected in the near future. The amendment will
most likely limit the scope of such review to that which is not de
novo. 147
142. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 524 F.2d 1190, 1215 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. deniedsub nom. Brown v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
143. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Charles
River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 939-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
144. 441 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
145. H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [65].
146. Id. at [6]. The Committee on Government Operations has recently proposed: "In
the event that the decision of the Supreme Court in [Chrysler] does not resolve this issue with
sufficient clarity, the committee recommends that FOIA be amended to specify the scope of
review for reverse-FOIA cases." .d. (emphasis added). In Chrysler, the Supreme Court did
not indicate what cases would be so extraordinary as to require a de novo review. The Court
also did not consider what record is proper for the APA review. The Court's stance toward
this issue was so vague that in a later case, GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790, 799 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit noted: "In Chrysler Cor. v.
Brown the Supreme Court did not reach the question whether Chrysler was entitled to a
trial de novo on its claim that the agency disclosure at issue exceeded the bounds of statutory
authority."
147. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). For a discussion of the reasons why judicial review in a re-
verse FOIA case should be narrower in scope than that in a FOIA case, see Campbell, supra
note 5, at 135-42 (one main reason given by the author is that "[i]n reverse FOIA cases, ...
the submitter is familiar with the information and should be able to present the argument
against disclosure at the agency level without requiring further evidentiary proceedings in
the district court"). Cf. Patten & Weinstein, supra note 71, at 206 ("Such review [that is not
de nova] is virtually meaningless since the administrative decision to disclose business
records is not based on a 'record' as that term is used in the [APA], but rather on an abbre-
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [
Futhermore, in Chrysler the Supreme Court did not comment on
the statement by the Third Circuit that the remedy for an inadequate
record of the agency is not a trial de novo but remand of the case to the
agency for an additional explanation of its decision.' 48 This statement,
however, was formulated by relying on an earlier Supreme Court deci-
sion, Camp v. Pills, which involved the judicial review of a decision by
the Comptroller of the Currency. 149 Thus the Court's silence in
Chrysler might indicate that it approves of this procedure in reverse
FOIA cases as well. Consequently, when the administrative record
fails to establish a clear basis for the agency's disclosure decision, the
procedure to be taken by the reviewing court is remand to the agency
for additional explanation of the reasons for its decision. 50
When providing de novo review for FOIA cases, Congress indi-
cated that such a review is "essential in order that the ultimate decision
as to the propriety of the agency's action is made by the court and to
prevent it from becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency
discretion."'' De novo review should be provided for reverse FOIA
cases as well, so that the truly aggrieved submitters will be afforded
adequate injunctive relief.
III. CONCLUSION
The approach to a reverse FOIA case proposed by the Supreme
Court in Chrysler is similar to that recommended by the 1976 House
Report of the Committee of Government Operations: "if material is
within the trade secrets exemption of the [FOIA] and therefore subject
to disclosure if the agency determines that disclosure is in the public
viated review of the requested records by an agency official, without the benefit of any other
comments or information."). In its prior decision, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1970), the Supreme Court stated that the "[APA] standard of
review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency." A bill has been recently introduced by Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas to
broaden the scope of APA review. The bill, currently known as S. 111, would amend § 10(e)
of the APA by providing explicitly for a de novo review. S. 111, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
See Woodward & Levin, In Defense o/Deference: Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 31 AD.
L. Rav. 329 (1979).
148. 565 F.2d at 1192.
149. 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
150. Courts have so frequently taken such a procedure that, in an article intended as a
guidance to agency lawyers, the author recommends: "[At] trial, the government should
assert that the injunction sought by the submitter is inappropriate because the judicially
preferred remedy is to remand to the agency for perfection of the administrative record."
English, Protecting the Stakeholder: Defense of the Government Agency' Interests During
Reverse FOA Lawsuits, 31 AD. L. REv. 151, 174 (1979).
151. S. REP. No. 89-813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1965).
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interest, section 1905 must be considered to ascertain whether the
agency is forbidden from disclosing the information."' 52 The Court re-
jected the view of the more recent 1978 House Report that, by virtue of
their regulations, federal agencies have discretion concerning the re-
lease of section 1905 information. 153 It held that the disclosure regula-
tions of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance lack "the force and
effect of law" to authorize disclosure of FOIA-exempt information fall-
ing within the prohibition of section 1905. The Third Circuit feared
that such an interpretation "would transmogrify § 1905 into a weapon
for those parties who advocate government secrecy."' 54
In fact, the Chrysler Court's holding provides a powerful weapon
for protection of corporate secrecy. 155 Corporate plaintiffs who can
show that an agency's proposed disclosure of their business informa-
tion will cause "substantial harm to [their] competitive position," 156
thus falling within exemption four of the FOIA, can now challenge
such disclosure by invoking section 1905 through APA review. They
no longer need to yield to the agency's policy requiring disclosure of all
information, FOIA-exempt or not, that "furthers the public interest."1
57
Instead of the nebulous task of showing that no legitimate public inter-
est in the proposed disclosure exists, the task is now more manageable.
Disclosure of FOIA-exempt information can now be enjoined by show-
ing that it violates section 1905 and therefore, being clearly "not in ac-
152. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2183, 2205.
153. H.R. REP. No. 95-1382, supra note 11, at [61]. See also note Ill supra.
154. 565 F.2d at 1187 (emphasis added).
155. The majority of FOIA requests for information, submitted by corporations, have
been made by business competitors rather than by individuals, public interest groups, or
news media reporters. NEWSWEEK, June 19, 1978, at 85-86. Commentators have noted that
the "FOIA administrative scheme fails to recognize the important differences between re-
quests for government records and requests for private business records." Patten & Wein-
stein, supra note 71, at 202. In its statement before a House Subcommittee, the Machinery
and Allied Products Institute expressed a similar concern:
Are confidential private documents converted into "Federal documents" merely by
the fact of government possession and which, incidentally, may have resulted from
a government requirement imposed upon the supplier of information? We believe
that a private document remains a private one even though information taken
therefrom may be used confidentially by government for its purposes or combined
with similar information from other private documents to constitute a wholly new
"Federal document."
Machinery and Allied Products Institute's testimony of October 4, 1977 before House Sub-
committee on Government Information and Individual Rights, 5636 MACHINE & ALLIED
PRODuCrs INST. BULL. 4 (1977).
156. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d at 770. See text accompa-
nying notes 74-75 supra.
157. 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.2(a). See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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cordance with law," must be set aside under the APA. By allowing
section 1905 to be reached through APA review, the Chrysler decision
has definitely made it less burdensome for corporate plaintiffs to pro-
tect the confidentiality of their business information in reverse FOIA
litigation.
Julia Yen George
